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The  availability  of  new  harmonized  data  on  bank  interest  rates  allows  a  rigorous 
assessment to be made of cross country price homogeneity/heterogeneity in euro area retail 
credit markets. Econometric analysis shows that the banking market is still highly segmented 
and  that  the  degree  of  integration  in  a  single  country  (Italy,  taken  as  a  benchmark  for 
integration) is greater than in the euro area. However, national differences can be partially 
explained by variables reflecting the characteristics of domestic depositors and borrowers 
(“demand side” regressors, such as risk exposure, disposable income, alternative financing 
sources, average firm size) and the characteristics of the banking systems (“supply side” 
regressors, such as banking market concentration, asset and liability structure). The euro area 
prices appear different because national banking products appear different or because they 
are differentiated by  national  factors. Once these factors have been controlled  for, many 
differences disappear.  
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A large stream of literature exists on the integration of national credit markets in the 
euro area. The European process of  integration  is expected to entail  more  homogeneous 
banking  systems  through  the  harmonization  of  financial  regulation,  the  single  monetary 
policy and the single currency.
2 
The literature has measured financial integration of the euro area for several sectors 
and products that make up a financial system, using various quantity and price indicators.
3 In 
this paper, we exploit new harmonized data on bank interest rates, which permit a consistent 
cross border  comparison,  to  verify  cross country  price  homogeneity/heterogeneity  in  the 
euro area retail credit markets. Indeed price level homogeneity across countries is often used 
as an indicator of the degree of market integration in an economic area.
4 
We divide our analysis into three steps. In the first step, we make an unconditional test 
of the cross country equality of interest rates, using two different econometric methods. In 
the other steps, we continue to use only one of two methods allowing for the effect of the 
main determinants of bank interest rates. If rates are different, but the difference is due to 
economic factors, it should disappear once we control for these factors. In our estimations 
we include the main determinants of bank interest rates, both “demand side” characteristics 
(second  step)  and  “supply  side”  characteristics  (third  step).  The  issues  in  the  extensive 
literature on bank interest rates are a second field of economic research related to this work.  
                                                    
1 We wish to express our particular thanks to Giacomo Cau, who has collaborated with us on an earlier 
paper entitled “Banking interest rates: a comparison between Italy and euro area”. We would like to thank 
Riccardo De Bonis, Donald Hester, Miria Rocchelli, Luigi Federico Signorini and two anonymous referees for 
help, comments and feedback, and all the participants at the meeting held by the Statistics Committee of the 
ESCB at Toulouse and at the seminars held at the Economic Research Department of the Bank of Italy. The 
usual disclaimer applies. The opinions expressed are those of the authors only and in no way involve the 
responsibility of the Bank. 
2 Some references are: Cecchini (1988); European Central Bank (1999a, 1999b, 2002); Padoa Schioppa 
(2000);  Danthine,  Giavazzi  and  Von  Thadden  (2000);  De  Bandt  (2000);  Dermine  (2000);  Belaisch  et  al. 
(2001); Adam et al. (2002); Dermine (2003); Trichet (2006). 
3 Adam et al. (2002); Affinito, De Bonis and Farabullini (2004); Calcagnini, Farabullini and Hester (2004); 
Bartiloro and De Bonis (2004); Manna (2004); Baele et al. (2004).  
4  On  the  other hand, identical  prices  across  countries  do not automatically  entail  an  integrated  market 
because they could accidentally appear even if market conditions were not competitive or if non competitive 




The  plan  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents  the  new  euro  area 
harmonized data on bank interest rates and some evidence on cross country dispersion. The 
third  section  reports two  econometric  exercises  measuring  cross country  similarities;  the 
Italian case is analyzed as benchmark of integration, comparing the euro area inter country 
variation  with  the  intra country  variation  of  Italian  regions.  The  fourth  section  provides 
regressions carried out using national determinants of differences in bank interest rates. The 
fifth section repeats the exercise on the homogeneity of euro area bank rates on “cleaned up” 
data, i.e. after controlling for the national factors influencing the level of interest rates. The 
final section summarizes our findings. 
2. The data and a descriptive analysis of the cross-country dispersion of bank interest 
rates  
This paper uses new harmonized monthly data on euro area banking interest rates, 
collected by the Eurosystem since January 2003. The statistics include 45 product specific 
rates  on  euro  deposits  and  loans  to  households  and  non financial  corporations,  on 
outstanding  amounts  and  new  business.  The  twelve  euro  area  National  Central  Banks 
(NCBs) use a common definition of the rates and follow the same methodological criteria in 
designing the sample of reporting agents (banks) and computing aggregates.
5  
The new data permit consistent cross border comparisons, both on deposit and lending 
rates. For the purposes of this paper, we have selected 5 deposit interest rates, 5 lending 
interest rates to households, and 4 lending interest rates to non financial corporations; Table 
1 reports some descriptive statistics on the 14 interest rates. All interest rates refer to new 
business for the period January 2003   March 2005. New business rates do not suffer from 
the national pre euro effects that could influence outstanding amounts. We have excluded 
                                                    
5 The new harmonized data are called “MIR”, or MFI interest rates. MFIs (Monetary Financial Institutions), 
which form the money issuing sector of the euro area, are the institutions subject to the statistical reporting 
requirements of the ECB. This information is collected and compiled by the Eurosystem primarily as a support 
for monetary policy; thus the data cover the main categories of bank deposits included in M3, and loans in the 
counterparts of M3. However, the harmonization of collection and compilation criteria makes the new data 
more generally suitable for economic analysis, both at national and at euro area level. Further details are in the 
Appendix. For methodological aspects, see Regulation N. 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18); ECB (2003); Battipaglia 
and Bolognesi (2003); Banca d’Italia (2003)   Supplements to the Statistical Bulletin, Monetary Financial 
Institutions: Banks and Money Market Funds, www.bancaditalia.it/publications/statistics.   
 
11 
rates on deposits of non financial corporations because of the low relevance of this category 
in  several  countries.  We  have  chosen  to  focus  on  weighted  aggregated  interest  rates, 
overlooking the breakdowns by maturity or initial period of rate fixation, because the aim of 
this paper is to test price homogeneity in the euro area: while differences may exist for 
individual  maturity  and  fixation  period,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case  for  the  overall 
average interest rate. 
The  descriptive  statistics  provide  some  preliminary  stylized  facts  on  cross country 
dispersion. Regarding deposit rates, the cross country coefficient of variation is higher for 
current accounts and deposits redeemable at notice, while it is lower for deposits with agreed 
maturity and for repos (Figure 1). The dispersion of interest rates on loans to households is 
lower than on deposits (Figure 2): loans for house purchases display minimum dispersion. 
Interest rates on loans to non financial corporations show a comparatively low degree of 
dispersion, except for overdrafts (Figure 3). The dispersion is slightly higher, however, for 
small loans (up to €1 million) than for large loans (over €1 million). 
Several aspects can explain the differences across countries. The dispersion of interest 
rates is partially due to persistent national practices. For example, the fees applied in some 
countries to overnight deposits affect the larger dispersion.
6 Further differences are due to 
the composition of  national  balance  sheets (Table 2).  For example,  in  several countries, 
deposits  redeemable  at  notice  are  widespread,  with  increasing  interest  rates  on  larger 
deposits,  and  are  used  even  for  settling  other  financial  products  such  as  mortgages;  by 
contrast, in other countries (such as Italy) they are less important and usually offer a low 
return. In a similar way, the very different share of overdrafts in the banking business of the 
12  countries  adds  to  the  dispersion;  this  probably  also  explains  why  the  “total  loans” 
indicator has a higher dispersion than each component.
7 
                                                    
6 In some countries, for example even for fiscal reasons, banks might prefer to apply lower fees and lower 
interest rates, but might behave the opposite way in other countries. In other countries again (mainly France) 
current accounts cannot bear interest. 
7 In some countries (Spain) bank overdrafts represent a residual type of financing with very high interest 
rates (Banco de España, 2004); in other countries (Italy) bank overdrafts are more usual and have a cost closer 
to other types of loans.   
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The characteristics of bank customers, mainly the risk profile of borrowers, are another 
factor influencing differences. For example, overdraft relationships imply a larger variance 
of the level of risk of the customer and this means a larger variance of interest rates applied 
to the borrowers.  
The  different  adjustments  to  monetary  policy  inputs  play  a  role  in  explaining  the 
dispersion among countries as well. Table 3 reports the changes of interest rates in the time 
frame considered.
8 Interest rates on overnight deposits and overdrafts display a low elasticity 
to policy rates, while interest rates on loans for house purchases undergo larger changes, 
despite their low absolute value.  
The next sections will investigate these preliminary suggestions further by analyzing 
first the existing homogeneity/heterogeneity in euro area bank interest rates and second the 
main determinants.  
 
3. Are euro area bank interest rates homogeneous?  
Interest rates can be studied by looking at developments over time, at their levels or at 
the spreads between rates. Since harmonized euro area banking interest rate series are still 
short,  the  study  of  changes  in  interest  rates  appears  less  interesting.  Specifically,  if  we 
wanted to estimate euro area rate convergence, we would need longer time series, at least 
spanning the 1999 changeover, in order to see whether it marked a break in geographical 
market segmentation.
9  
Although it is not yet possible to analyze long run convergence, the new harmonized 
data make it possible to assess, in a static sense, the current degree of similarity between 
                                                    
8 In the time period analyzed, bank interest rates have been affected by the decrease in the policy rates set 
by the ECB. Between January 2003 and March 2005, the interest rate on the main refinancing operations was 
reduced by 75 basis points in all. The (minimum) interest rate on main refinancing operations was lowered 
from 2.75 to 2.50 per cent as of 7 March 2003 and to 2 per cent as of 6 June 2003. 
9 For example, Adam et al. (2002) compute β convergence and σ convergence for some non harmonized 
bank interest rates, using pre  and post January 1999 dummies. The speed of convergence, measured by β 
convergence, is shown by Adam et al (2002) to accelerate after the 1999 changeover; it is estimated to be high 
for the interbank rate, intermediate for the mortgage rate, and low for the rate on loans to firms. See Sander and 




10 The idea is that, since European banking markets have undergone a 
significant process of integration in the last few decades, the current level of bank interest 
rates should reflect this convergence.
11 Our focus is twofold, on interest rate categories and 
on countries. In other words, we want to find out which interest rate categories are more 
homogeneous across Europe and which countries are more “similar” in a pairwise and/or 
multi country sense. At this stage, there is no attempt at an economic explanation of rate 
setting. 
In this first step of our analysis, we use two approaches to assess the homogeneity of 
interest rates in the euro area. 
First approach: tests of zero mean stationarity of differentials. The first  method is 
utilized in the empirical literature on the convergence processes. Over recent years, the issue 
of convergence has attracted considerable attention mainly with reference to inflation, and 
has been studied essentially in the context of unit root and co integration tests for panel data. 
Consistently with the existing literature, we begin our analysis following this approach.  
The exercise is based both on the ADF (Augumented Dickey Fuller) test and on the 
KPSS  (Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin)  test,  applied  to the  bilateral  differentials  δt
i  j 
between the bank interest rates of each pair of countries:
12  
δt
i j = ri, t – rj, t  (1.a) 
                                                    
10 In order to analyze long run convergence one could chain link the new harmonized statistics with interest 
rate series previously used by the Eurosystem (the so called “RIR statistics”, retail interest rates; ECB Monthly 
Bulletin stressed that RIR statistics “should be used with caution and for statistical purposes only, primarily to 
analyze  their  development  over  time  rather  than  their  level”).  However,  there  are  doubts  whether  this  is 
legitimate. The latter statistics, while much longer, are not harmonized. The two sets of series overlap for only 
a very short time (the first half of 2003); looking at coefficients of variation over that time, the new statistics 
differ significantly from the previous ones in terms of level and sometimes even trend (Figures 4 5). Therefore 
any analysis based on chain linking old and new statistics has to be very careful and we do not attempt it in this 
paper. 
11 In this light, the analyses of margin and level differences would provide similar indications; possible 
different  implications  in  the  margins  analysis  would  be  seized  by  focusing  on  the  instrument  categories. 
Moreover, the product specific rates analysis can show a different degree of homogeneity in some markets, 
which could pass unnoticed in the margin analysis. For the sake of completeness, however, we extended the 
analysis (see below) to two spreads: the first between the average rate on total loans to households and on total 
deposits, and the second between the average rate on total loans to firms and on total deposits. 
12 For the methodological details, see Bell, Dickey and Miller (1985); Kwiatkowski et al. (1992); Hobjin 




ri, t; rj, t  are the interest rates, specific to each test, for countries i and j (i ≠ j) in month t; t = 
1,  2,  …,  27  months;  i,  j  =  1,  2,  …,  n  countries;  n  is  not the  same  in  all  interest  rate 
categories.
13 
According to the strategy proposed by Harvey and Carvalho (2002), we can state that 
two countries have homogeneous interest rates when the interest differential δt
i  j between 
them is a zero mean stationary process. The ADF test, preliminarily, verifies weather the 
differentials δt
i  j are non stationary processes. Then the KPSS test verifies the zero mean 
stationarity of stationary δt
i j, rejecting the null hypothesis (zero mean stationarity) for a large 
value of ξ statistic:
14  
 
                                                                                                        (1.b) 
 
where σ²LR is a non parametric estimator, robust to autocorrelation and to etheroscedasticity, 
of the long run variance of δt
i j. 
The two tests are repeated for the 14 bank interest rates listed in Table 1 and for all 
pairwise differentials among the 12 euro area countries. Table 4, second column, reports the 
total number of bilateral differentials for each bank interest rate: n (n – 1) / 2. It is equal to 
66  when  the  interest  rate  category  exists  in  all  countries;  it  is  equal  to  55  for  deposits 
redeemable at notice and to 15 for repos. The third column of Table 4 shows the outcomes of 
the ADF and KPSS tests: figures report the number of stationary and converging bilateral 
combinations at the 5 per cent significance level. 
These results show a widespread heterogeneity between the bank interest ratesin the 
euro area countries. The homogeneity is relatively high only for interest rates on loans to 
                                                    
13 For deposits redeemable at notice, data are missing for Greece; for repos, data are missing for Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 
14 The unit root and KPSS tests have been run without intercept terms because, as shown by Busetti et al. 
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15 
non financial corporations over €1 million, where 30 per cent of bilateral differentials are 
zero mean stationary processes. 
Second approach: tests of equality of estimated country coefficients. Similar outcomes 
emerge when we use the second approach, which is based on tests of equality of estimated 
country coefficients in each interest rate category and verifies the statistical significance of 
differences in levels. At this stage, however, the only independent variables are time and 
binary country dummies. 
Again we use the 14 bank interest rates listed in Table 1 as dependent variables in as 
many regressions. All regressions are of the form:  
ri, t = α1 m
1
i, t + … + α27 m
27
i, t + β1 d
1
i, t + β2 d
2
i, t + … + βn d
n
i, t + εi, t  (2.a) 
where: 
ri, t   is defined as in equation (1); 
αp and βk are coefficients; 
m
p
i, t  is a time (monthly) dummy equal to 1 when p = t, and 0 otherwise; 
d
k
i, t   is a country dummy equal to 1 when k = i, and 0 otherwise; 
εi, t   is an error term. 
The number of observations is 324 (12*27) when the interest rate exists in each euro 
area country, smaller otherwise.
15  
Statistical tests of the significance of bilateral differentials for each pair of countries 
are  used  to  assess  the  pairwise  similarity  between  countries.  The  tests  verify  the  null 
hypothesis that each pair of coefficients, estimated in the regression equations, is equal: 
H0: βi = βj  (2.b) 
                                                    
15 The observations are 297 for deposits redeemable at notice and 162 for repos.  
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We test the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal at the 5 per cent significance 
level, and we accept or reject the null hypothesis on the basis of the F[1, 27n – k] statistic. 
When the data do not reject the equality of coefficients, we say that the bilateral interest rate 
differentials are not significant and therefore the interest rates for the pair of countries are 
similar.  
Table 4, fourth column, reports the number of cases in which the bilateral differentials 
are not significant. The results are partially different from the former approach, mainly for 
repos  and  loans  to  firms  of  more  than  €1  million,  but  substantially  confirm  the  first 
impression:  the  interest  rates  level  is  not  homogeneous  across  countries  and  hence  the 
European banking industry still appears highly segmented. 
Nevertheless, some instrument category interest rates are more homogeneous. Figure 6 
reports, for each interest rate category, the percentage share of non significant differentials 
on  total  differentials.  Interest  rates  on  repos  are  much  more  uniform  than  those  on  the 
remaining deposits; lending interest rates for non financial corporations are more uniform 
than for households; and for large loans (i.e. loans of more than €1 million) than for small 
loans (i.e. up to €1 million). These results  suggest that, when  bank  customers are  more 
informed and more financially developed (e.g. repos versus overnight deposits, enterprises 
versus households, large versus small corporations), there are more choices at their disposal 
and geographical segmentation becomes less relevant; thus average interest rates tend to be 
more uniform across the euro area.  
Both methods allow us also to verify whether interest rates are homogeneous for at 
least some pairs of countries. Table 5 summarizes the main results concerning the bilateral 
equality of coefficients.
16 The upper panel reports the total number of bilateral differentials 
for each pair of countries. The lower panel shows the number of cases in which the bilateral 
differentials are non significant. The total number of bilateral differentials is equal to 11 
                                                    
16 To improve the fluency of the paper we report country by country analysis only for the second approach, 
since outcomes of the two models are substantially similar; in addition, the second approach is used in the rest 
of the paper.  
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when all rate categories exist for a pair of countries.
17 Figure 6 reports, for each country, the 
percentage share of non significant differentials in total differentials. 
In general, smaller countries (Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg) have a larger total 
number  of  non significant  bilateral  differentials.  Geographical  proximity,  cultural 
characteristics  and  institutional  banking  patterns  do  not  seem  to  explain  the  statistical 
similarity between interest rates. For example bank interest rates do not appear similar either 
between the Netherlands and Belgium or between Spain and Portugal.  
Our second approach is less sophisticated than the first one, but it is nonetheless used 
in empirical literature. Levy and Panetta (1993) carry out a similar exercise to analyze the 
similarity of real interest rates in G7 countries between the 1960s and 1980s. Jackson (1992) 
studies  the  transmission  of  interest  rate  shocks  in  different  U.S.  regions,  using  a  set  of 
regional  dummies  and  taking  significance  of  regional  dummies  as  evidence  for  market 
segmentation.  Moreover,  this  second  approach  allows  us  to take the  analysis  further  by 
inserting the determinants of interest rates, and is then used, in place of the former one, in the 
rest of the paper. 
3.1. A benchmark of integration: Italian regions versus euro area countries 
For  a  better  understanding  of  the  previous  results,  we  have  repeated  the  same 
econometric exercise  for the 20 regions of Italy. The idea  is that the bank  interest rates 
should  be  more  homogeneous  in  an  area  (Italy)  with  the  same  legal  system,  with  bank 
customers that have more similar features, and with same macroeconomic conditions.
18  
We  have  adopted  the  same  simple  econometric  specification  as  in  equation  (2), 
regressing the bank interest rates of Italian regions on 20 dummies (one for each Italian 
region instead of for the 12 euro area countries) and on 10 quarterly time dummies (instead 
of the 27 monthly dummies of the euro area equation). The test has been carried out using 
                                                    
17 The three aggregate rates (total deposits of households, total loans to households and total loans to non 
financial corporations) are excluded from this analysis. 
18 In other words, the banking system of a single country should be integrated, and therefore it should 
represent a benchmark for assessing the level of euro area integration.  
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quarterly data on interest rates from the Italian Central Credit Register.
19 To enhance the 
comparison between Italian data and those of the euro area countries, we have selected six 
aggregate rates (3 for lending and 3 for borrowing interest rates) that are defined similarly in 
the national Central Credit Register and in Eurosystem statistics.  
Figure 7 shows that the percentage share of similar interest rates is larger for Italian 
regions than for euro area countries.
20 It is interesting to note the similar percentage of non 
significant differentials, both in Italy and the euro area, on bank overdrafts to non financial 
corporations.  In  this  case,  the  similar  situation  between  Italian  regions  and  euro  area 
countries could be explained by the fact that this kind of loan has a higher credit risk and 
worse guarantees both in Italy and in the euro area.  
To summarize, the results of the first step of our analysis simply show that, despite EU 
integration, the euro area banking market is still segmented and inter country dispersion is 
greater than intra country dispersion. This may be due to cross country differences in the 
riskiness  of  customers,  legislation,  financial  and  banking  structures,  and/or  banking 
practices. In any case, it is worth noting that, even at the national level, interest rates are not 
fully  homogeneous  and  that,  consistently  with  other  analyses,  deposits  are  more 
homogeneous than loans. In Banca d'Italia (1996) it is argued that the higher dispersion of 
bank interest rates on loans can reflect, even in a single country, different risk classes of 
borrowers and differences in local banking markets
21. 
In this light, we repeated the same test of equality of estimated coefficients of Italian 
regions after adding in the equations three regressors influencing bank rates. The regressors 
are defined at regional level as well and they capture the effect on bank rates of the riskiness 
of  borrowers  (i.e.  the  ratio  between  bad  loans  and  total  loans,  only  in  the  lending  rate 
regressions), of banking  market concentration (Herfindahl  indexes of  loans and deposits, 
                                                    
19 The data from the Italian Central Credit Register are only available on a quarterly basis. The Italian time 
series are longer than the euro area ones, but we have selected 10 quarters (from September 2001 to December 
2003) in order to compare time samples of similar length. To check the robustness of the results we have 
repeated  the  exercise  for  Italian  regions  over  a  long period  horizon  (20  quarters,  from  January  1999  to 
December 2003) and the results have remained substantially stable. 
20 Symmetrically, we used the first approach based on ADF and KPSS tests for Italian regions as well. The 
comparison of outcomes in Italian regions and in euro area countries produced similar differences in both 
approaches.  
21  See also De Bonis and Ferrando (1997)  
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alternatively) and of macroeconomic trends (growth rate of regional GDP). Figure 8 shows 
that  these  determinants  further  explain  the  residual  differences  among  rates  in  Italian 
regions: after controlling for those factors, the percentage shares of non significant cross 
region rate differentials increase for all instrument categories.  
As  a  consequence,  we  expect  that these  factors  play  a  role  even  in  the  degree  of 
integration of euro area bank interest rates: this is the argument of the next sections. 
4. The determinants of national differences in euro area bank interest rates 
Having  established that cross country differences are pervasive, the  next step is to 
investigate the determinants of national interest rates, i.e. the origins of rate heterogeneity in 
the  euro  area.  To  this  purpose  we  employ  both  “demand  side”  regressors,  i.e.  factors 
influencing interest rate setting behaviour related to the characteristics of bank depositors 
and borrowers; and “supply side” regressors, i.e. those determinants of rates that depend on 
banking system characteristics (both macroeconomic and aggregated microeconomic data). 
In formal terms, we adopt the following general specification:  
ri, t = α't Ti, t + β'i Di, t + γ' Xi, t + δ' Zi, t + εi, t  (3) 
where: 
ri, t, εi, tare defined as in equation (2.a); Ti, t is a matrix of time (monthly) dummies; Di, t is a 
matrix of country dummies; in the notation of equation (2.b) we used vectors of dummies 
instead of matrices; 
α, β, γ and δ are vectors of coefficients; 
Xi, t   is a matrix of demand side regressors; 
Zi, t  is a matrix of supply side regressors. 
We  regress  the  14  bank  interest  rates  of  each  euro  area  country  analyzed  in  the 
previous sections on matrices of their determinants. The matrices Xi,t and Zi,  t include the 
same  covariates  in  the  regressions  of  the  5  categories  of  deposit  interest  rates;  in  the 
regressions of the 5 categories of lending interest rates to households; and in the 4 categories  
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of lending interest rates to non financial corporations. The regressors are rates of change or 
ratios between variables. 
Many channels may influence banks’ price behaviour. We use an eclectic approach. 
Even  if  the  systematic  exploration  of  all  determinants  of  bank  interest  rates  were to  go 
beyond  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  the  regressors  selected  in  our  exercises  should  be 
representative of the main effects proposed in the literature. On the other hand, we do not 
allow  for  the  decreasing  official  rates  set  by  the  Eurosystem  in  our  sample  time.  First, 
official rates are country invariant in the euro area, and thus they are not able to add clear 
explanations for national differences. Second, although the official rates are time variant, the 
adjustment of national banking rates to monetary policy inputs occurs in the same months, 
and therefore the effect is captured by the time dummies included in our regressions. 
The distinction between demand side and supply side regressors is partly conventional. 
Actually, the two kinds of explanatory variables affect  interest rates together. Moreover, 
there  is  not always a  clear difference.  For example, we regard the  composition of  bank 
balance sheets as a factor influencing interest rates on the supply side, but it depends on 
customer preferences as well. Nonetheless, we try to disentangle the two effects. The aim of 
this distinction is to stress the different influence of two kinds of variables on interest rate 
heterogeneity. Moreover, in the next section, we exploit this distinction to define banking 
products in a homogeneous way. 
The descriptions of variables, data sources, OLS estimates and robustness checks are 
detailed in the Methodological Appendix. The main econometric outcomes are summarized 
in Table 6, where the signs of coefficients at the 5 per cent level of significance are grouped 
for the three kinds of bank rates: on deposits, on loans to households and on loans to non 
financial  corporations.  Here  we  highlight  the  basic  economic  sense  of  the  results  and 
examine the correspondences with the relations proposed by the literature. The next three 
sub sections  refer  to  three  kinds  of  determinants  of  interest  rates.  The  first  sub section 
concerns the demand side explanatory variables. The other two sub sections refer to supply 
side explanatory variables: the first includes the bank operative characteristics, the second 
covers the banking systems structural characteristics.   
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4.1 Demand side explanatory variables 
 
The demand side regressors are the GDP change rate; households’ disposable income; 
an indicator of alternative financial saving; an indicator of alternative sources of financing; 
and average firm size. A different set of regressors is used in equation (3) for deposit rates, 
for lending rates to households and for those to non financial corporations. 
Real GDP growth 
Economic theory suggests that the increases in GDP positively affect credit demand, 
and hence lending rates, if they are permanent, while their effect on deposit rates is more 
ambiguous (Melitz and Pardue, 1973). 
As stressed by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1995), interest rates on loans are positively 
influenced by real GDP growth, because better economic conditions improve the number of 
projects  becoming profitable, thus  increasing credit demand. But at the same time, only 
increases  in  permanent  income  have  a  positive  influence  on  credit  demand,  while  the 
transitory component of GDP should be associated with a self financing effect that reduces 
recourse to bank loans (Friedman and Kuttner, 1993). Symmetrically, the interest rates on 
deposits could be negatively  influenced  by  increases  in the transitory component of real 
GDP, because only when unexpected income (transitory GDP) grows does the supply of 
deposits by customers increase, and therefore banks set lower deposit rates. 
In  our  estimates,  the  real  GDP  growth  rate  is  not  significant  for  interest  rates  on 
deposits and on loans to non financial corporations, while it is positive and significant for 
interest rates on loans to households.  
 
Disposable income 
Household  disposable  income  (total  disposable  income  divided  by  the  number  of 
households) is a different indicator from the GDP growth rate discussed previously. The  
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GDP growth rate is an  indicator of general  macroeconomic conditions, while disposable 
income  is an  indicator of the spending (saving) capacity of  households. Therefore, there 
should be no problems of collinearity.
22 
The effect of disposable income on deposit interest rates can be negative a priori if 
increases imply an increasing supply of deposits, whereas it can be positive a priori if higher 
disposable  income  implies  a  decreasing  supply  of  deposits  (as  consumed)  or  a  stronger 
bargaining power of savers. Its effect on interest rates on loans to households should be 
negative,  because  it  both  decreases  the  demand  for  credit  and  increases  households’ 
bargaining power.  
Our results seem to corroborate the latter hypothesis in relation to deposit rates, for 
which the sign of the coefficient is uniform, positive and significant. In the equations of 
lending rates to households the sign of disposable income is not uniform among instrument 
categories, but the negative effect prevails (4 out of 5 rate categories).  
Alternative forms of saving  
In the equations of borrowing interest rates we used the ratio between Government 
bonds  and  GDP  as  an  indicator of  financial  investment. The  idea  is  that  intermediation 
spreads will  be adversely  affected  if  substitutes to banking products appear on  financial 
markets, both when households have access to alternative financial instruments and when 
firms issue securities on financial markets as a substitute for bank loans. 
In  our  exercises,  as  expected,  the  availability  of  alternative  financial  investments 
affects deposit interest rates positively: in the countries where savers have at their disposal 
more financial instruments, the supply of deposits decreases, and therefore banks set higher 
deposit rates.  
Alternative financing sources 
                                                    
22  According  to  standard  consumer  theory,  decisions  of  spending  (and  saving)  depend  on  households 
income and wealth. The measures of  financial wealth of  households in national financial accounts are not 
available for all euro area countries.   
 
23 
Symmetrically to the use of an alternative form of saving in the deposit rate equations, 
we employed an indicator of alternative sources of financing in regressions of interest rates 
on loans to non financial corporations. We used, as indicator of direct finance, firms’ market 
capitalization on bank loans.
23  
Direct finance competes with bank loans and therefore it should reduce lending rates. 
By contrast, in our regressions, where firms issue a greater quantity of shares, banks set 
higher lending rates. A possible explanation for this apparent paradox is that the degree of 
availability of direct finance changes the composition of bank borrowers. Direct financing is 
usually less expensive than intermediate financing and therefore loan applicants are only 
those  agents  that  cannot  obtain  direct  debt  in  financial  markets,  either  because  their 
reputation is insufficient (Diamond, 1991) or because they do not have enough capital or 
collateral (Holmström and Tirole, 1997). When direct financing increases, more and more 
firms receive funding directly from the market, and hence the few firms that continue to 
apply for bank loans are the riskier ones and must pay higher interest rates.  
Risk exposure 
The probability of bankruptcy of the customer is an important determinant of loan 
interest  rates.  Lending  rates  include  a  risk  component  (the  risk  of  default),  which  is 
influenced by the borrowers’ economic prospects and by the quality of collateral. Banks that 
invest in riskier projects will ask for a higher interest rate return in order to compensate for 
the higher percentage of loans that may have to be written off.
24 Consequently, cross country 
                                                    
23 In our estimates we used corporate bonds as well. See details in the Methodological Appendix. 
24 The link between level of interest rates, risk, collateral and relationship banking is quite complex and 
economic theory suggests contrasting views. Credit institutions do not necessarily adjust the interest rate with 
rising risk. Banks could choose to ration the credit supply in order to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Moreover, the provision of collateral or relationship banking might decrease lending 
rates by reducing the problem of asymmetric information. As is well documented in the literature (Lummer and 
McConnell, 1989; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Boot, 2000), close  customer relationships between firms and 
banks, owing to a steady flow of information, increase the expected value to the bank of a continuation of the 
relationship and enable loans to be granted at more favourable conditions as to interest rates and volume. On 
the other hand, recent banking literature (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2000) has argued that collateral may 
have a perverse, negative effect on banks’ risk because it may reduce screening and monitoring of the debtors. 
Similarly, relationship banking may result in higher interest rates (Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri, 1998), which 
can be attributed to a lock in effect of the borrowers and stronger bargaining power of the banks.   
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variations  in  the  interest  rate  level  might  arise  from  differences  in  the  risk  profiles  of 
domestic borrowers. 
We used, as a proxy of the riskiness of loan applicants, the ratio between bank total 
loss  provisions  and  total  loans.  The  simple  idea  is  that  where  banks  have  larger  loss 
provisions, the borrowers are riskier.
25 
Our results confirm that the level of lending interest rates to non financial corporations 
rises with an increase in risk. On the contrary, our risk related variable does not have a 
uniform effect for lending rates to households. It is worth noting that, because of the lack of 
better information, the proxy we used as a measure of risk exposure, i.e. the ratio between 
bank total loss provisions and total loans, is more relevant for firms than for households. 
Average firm size 
The average firm size, measured by non financial corporations’ value added divided 
by the number of firms, can influence interest rates on loans, in the sense that lending rates 
tend to be lower for larger firms. The descriptive statistics indicate that the interest rate on 
loans over €1 million is lower than on loans of up to €1 million. The reason is that when 
firms are larger, the bargaining power of credit institutions declines and they then quote 
lower interest rates. Our econometric exercises corroborate this idea, showing that average 
firm size in a country is negatively and significantly correlated with lending rates.  
 
4.2 Supply side explanatory variables: bank operating characteristics 
 
                                                    
25 The share of loss provisions on total loans could act as a proxy also for the capacity of the legal system to 
safeguard lenders’ rights: again, when banks are forced to make larger loss provisions it is because the legal 
system is less efficient. Actually, in some specifications we used as a proxy of legal and judiciary system 
(in)efficiency another variable: the usual duration of enforcement procedures for mortgage loans. The results 
confirm that where the time taken for the procedure is longer, lending rates tend to increase. The inclusion of 
this regressor did not distort the other results of the estimates, but we eliminated it because the available data 
are time invariant. See Cecchetti (1999) and the Methodological Appendix.  
 
25 
Bank balance sheet characteristics are bank operating costs, bank non interest income, 
bank  liquidity,  bank  capitalization,  bank  liability  structure,  and  bank  asset  structure.  A 
different set of regressors is used in equation (3) for deposit and lending rates. 
Bank operating costs  
In  the  Monti Klein  model  (Monti,  1972;  Klein,  1971),  assuming  barriers  between 
markets, banks set lending and borrowing interest rates by applying, respectively, a mark up 
and a mark down both on a refinancing rate and on management costs. If this is the case, 
banks’ operating costs should have a positive effect on interest rates on loans and a negative 
effect on deposit rates. 
In our estimates, the coefficient of the variable “operating costs” has mixed signs when 
the dependent variables are the specific components of average interest rates on deposits and 
on  loans  to  households.  However,  it  is  significant  and  has  the  expected  signs  in  the 
regressions of interest rates on loans to non financial corporations (significantly positive), on 
total  deposits  (significantly  negative)  and  on  total  loans  to  households  (significantly 
positive). This makes sense because it is more likely that banks apply mark ups and mark 
downs, as suggested by  Monti Klein, on average  interest rates and  not on their  specific 
components.  
Bank non interest income 
We  also  employed  a  variable  measuring  the  share  of  non interest  income  in  bank 
balance  sheets.  The  idea  is  that,  because  of  falling  net interest  spreads  in  the  past  few 
decades,  European  banks  have  been  shifting  their  focus  away  from  interest generating 
activities,  such  as  deposit  taking  and  lending,  towards  more  profitable  fee generating 
services. The different intensity of this shift in each banking system could affect national 
differences in interest rates.  
Our results show that in countries where the proportion of bank profits depends more 
on services, banks set higher interest rates on deposits and lower interest rates on loans to 
households. This outcome could  indicate that banks compensate  lower  lending rates and  
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higher deposit rates with higher fees for financial services. Or, in other terms, since banks 
can count on several sources of revenue, when the competitive pressure is strong on a market 
segment, banks seek to make higher profits in other segments.  
If this is the case, banking services should be seen as a bundle of products, the bank 
customers would buy banking services as a package. Hence price homogeneity and banking 
market integration should be analyzed for the entire package and not for its components. 
However, these suggestions are mainly issues for future research. In fact, the effect of non 
interest  income  proportion  is  clear  for  deposits  (positive)  and  for  loans  to  households 
(negative), but it is not significant for loans to firms. 
Bank liquidity and capitalization 
Our  regressors  include  some  aggregated  balance  sheet  items.  The  first  two  are  a 
measure of national banking system liquidity (cash plus holdings of Government bonds as a 
share of total assets) and an indicator of bank capitalization (capital and reserves as a share 
of total assets). The inclusion of these regressors is in line with the suggestions of bank 
lending channel theory. According to this strand of research, when policy rates decrease (as 
in the time period analyzed), liquid and well capitalized banks let interest rates on loans fall 
(and interest rates on deposits increase) more than banks with a low liquid asset and a low 
capital asset  ratio  (Bernanke Blinder,  1988;  Bernanke Gertler,  1995;  Thakor  (1996); 
Kashyap Stein, 1995 and 2000; Kishan Opiela, 2000). Actually, the bank lending channel 
theory  refers  to  microeconomic  bank specific  features.  Lacking  comparable  micro 
information, we used macro level average data in the hope that distributional issues would 
not distort the picture too much. 
In  our  estimates,  highly capitalized  banking  systems  have  lower  lending  rates  and 
higher deposit rates; highly liquid banking systems have lower lending rates to non financial 
corporations, and higher rates to households. Last result apart, these outcomes are consistent 
with previous empirical work, both on Italian lending rates (Angeloni et al., 1995; Cottarelli 
at al., 1995) and on euro area interest rates (Ehrmann et al., 2001 and 2003; Gambacorta, 
2001 and  2003; Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon, 2003).   
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Bank liability structure and bank asset structure 
Two more regressors are suggested by the bank lending channel literature: the ratio 
between deposits and total liabilities (liability structure indicator) for deposit rates, and the 
ratio between long term loans and total loans (asset structure indicator) for lending rates. 
The first indicator, proposed by Berlin and Mester (1999), is based on the idea that 
banks that finance themselves mainly through bonds, rather than deposits, will set higher 
deposit rates (and adjust them by more) because their liabilities are more affected by market 
movements and their refinancing costs then increase contemporaneously and to a similar 
extent to market rates. In other words, when banks hold a large amount of deposits instead of 
bonds, they do not fall under pressure from market rate movements and can afford to pay 
lower rates.
26 Accordingly, in our estimates, banking systems in which deposits account for a 
larger share of liabilities set lower rates on all deposit categories but repos. 
With  reference  to  the  second  indicator  (asset  structure),  banks  that  have  a  higher 
proportion of long term loans should set lower lending rates for two reasons. First, they 
could be expected to care more for credit relationships with their customers, and therefore 
should grant loans at more favourable conditions (Berger and Udell, 1992); second, banks 
with long term customers could set lower lending rates as part of an implicit risk sharing 
agreement, based on the risk aversion of their better borrowers (Fried and Howitt, 1980). 
Accordingly,  in  our  estimates  the  asset  structure  indicator  is  inversely  correlated  with 
lending rates, both to non financial corporations and to households. 
 
4.3 Supply side explanatory variables: structural characteristics of banking systems 
 
                                                    
26 See also Favero, Giavazzi and Fabbi (1999); Gambacorta (2005).  
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Banking system structural characteristics are the same for both deposit and lending 
rates:  bank  international  presence,  banking  market  concentration,  bank  average  size  and 
bank mergers and acquisitions. 
Banks’ international presence  
The share of foreign banks in a market can be an indicator of competitive pressure, 
and, according to the theory, increasing competition would lead to lower loan interest rates 
and  higher  deposit  interest  rates.  Moreover,  increased  international  presence  should  be 
accompanied  by  an  increase  in  cross border  activity.  This  might  homogenize  banking 
behaviours and result in more integrated retail banking markets. In our exercises, a larger 
presence of foreign banks, measured by the market share of branches and subsidiaries of 
non domestic banks as a percentage of total assets, positively affects the level of interest 
rates  on  deposits,  negatively  affects  the  lending  rates  to  households  and  positively  the 
lending rates to non financial corporations. 
Banking market concentration, bank average size and bank M&As 
We tested three kinds of variables concerning the banking system structure: market 
concentration (i.e. the share of the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets); bank average 
size (i.e. total assets on number of banks); and banking M&As (i.e. number of domestic bank 
mergers and acquisitions on total number of domestic banks).  
The banking literature underlines two possible impacts of concentration on the pricing 
behaviour of banks. Following the Monti Klein model, and in general the class of models 
applying  the  structure conduct performance  approach  to  banking  activity  (Berger  and 
Hannan, 1989), intermediation margins are higher when banks have greater market power. 
Therefore, as market power increases, i.e. as the market becomes more concentrated and the 
intensity of competition decreases, mark ups and mark downs increase, and banks set lower 
deposit rates and higher lending rates.
27 By contrast, a second class of models, the so called 
                                                    
27 Symmetrically, as the intensity of competition increases, rates on loans (rates on deposits) become less 
(more) sensitive to monetary policy tightening.  
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efficient structure approach (Demsetz, 1973), suggests an inverse relation between rates and 
concentration. In this view, concentration is due to more efficient banks taking over less 
efficient  counterparts;  therefore,  more  concentrated  markets  should  be  associated  with 
increased efficiency and with lower management costs, and hence concentration should have 
a negative impact on spreads.
28 
All our indicators of market concentration provide evidence in favour of the structure 
conduct performance hypothesis. More market concentration, a larger bank average size and 
the recent process of consolidation increase the market power of banks, and the effects tend 
to be negative on deposit rates and positive on lending rates. By contrast, it is interesting that 
the systems with on average larger banks set lower lending rates to firms. 
5. Turning again to test for national differences: demand and supply effects on banking 
market segmentation  
In this section we repeat, on equation (3), the initial exercise on equality of estimated 
country coefficients described in equations (2.a – 2.b). In fact, in equations (2.a – 2.b) we did 
not take account of national characteristics because the aim was only to test for the existence 
of cross country homogeneity/heterogeneity in the level of interest rates on the raw data. 
Now we repeat the same exercise after controlling for those factors that should explain the 
differences. In other terms, if equation (3) allows us to homogenize banking products, i.e. to 
“clean  up”  data  from  factors  that  differentiate  otherwise  identical  services,  we  can 
effectively  investigate  rate  homogeneity  and  study  the  effect  of  those  factors on  market 
segmentation. For example, if loan applicants are different because they do not belong to the 
same credit risk class, the underlying loan is not identical. On the contrary, once the risk 
profile of borrower has been controlled for, if the interest rates become similar, we can say 
the rates are homogeneous.
29 
                                                    
28 See also Focarelli and Panetta (2003); Hannan and Prager (2004). 
29 The euro area bank customers are different even if the ongoing integration process in the euro area real 
economy  has  progressively  increased  the  similarities  between  them.  Similar  considerations  are  present  in 
Eichengreen (1984) and Bodenhorn (1995). They criticized the results of Stigler and Sherwin (1985), who had 
investigated the deregulation process  of the U.S. banking system  by testing the nominal interest parity on 
mortgage loans. Eichengreen (1984) and Bodehorn (1995) argued that the declining interest rate spreads found  
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First, we test for the equality of country coefficients employing in equation (3) only 
the  “demand  side”  regressors;  then  we  repeat  the  same  test  on  the  country  coefficients 
resulting  from  the  general  specification  of  equation  (3)  with  both  demand  and  supply 
covariates.  We  distinguish  the  effect  of  the  demand  regressors  from  the  overall  effect, 
because the former should make it possible to take into account only the characteristics of 
bank customers, while the overall effect allows us to see how the characteristics of national 
banking systems influence euro area segmentation. The demand side factors certainly define 
a  product,  while  it  is  disputable  whether  the  same  goes  for  the  supply  side  factors. 
Undoubtedly,  in our example a  loan  is comparable  if the risk profile of the  borrower is 
comparable. But market power also differentiates the perception of goods, and therefore it 
can be taken into account as well. In any case we disentangle the two effects. Therefore, the 
supply side factors either contribute to define a product or show the effect we should see on 
bank prices if euro area banking systems became more homogeneous. 
30 
Table 4 (fifth and last column) and Table 7 (upper and lower side) report the various 
results of the statistical tests on the significance of bilateral differentials, respectively after 
controlling for the demand side regressors (second step of our analysis) and for the overall 
effect of both demand and supply side regressors (third step in our terms). Figure 9 shows, 
with  differently  coloured  histograms,  the  percentage  shares  of  statistically  similar 
differentials  in  each  of  the  three  steps  of  our  exercise.  As  expected,  the  similarities 
progressively increase, moving from the tests based on only time and country dummies to 
those based on demand regressors and up to those based on all the regressors. Therefore, 
when  our  estimate  takes  into  consideration  the  effect  of  the  characteristics  of  national 
customers and then also of national banking systems, the similarity between countries and 
hence euro area homogeneity increase. In one case only (repos) the regressors do not have 
                                                                                                                                                                 
by Stigler and Sherwin (1985) were due to increasingly the homogeneous characteristics of regional credit 
markets. See also Adam et al. (2002).  
30 Our exercise does not consider the effect of the fiscal framework. In our view, this should affect bank 
rates mainly on the demand side. In fact, what matters for bank rates is not the general taxation on banks, but 
the taxation on bank products (i.e. if deposit rates are taxable, if rates paid on mortgages are deductible, the tax 
deductibility of interest rates on non financial corporations). The taxation on bank products can influence the 
behaviour of bank customers and hence interest rates. The issue is complex. The lack of harmonized data, the 
difficulty of finding good information or building a good proxy put us off including this effect in the exercise. 
However, its inclusion would probably strengthen our results.   
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explanatory power and the level of homogeneity is higher before controlling for national 
characteristics.
31 
Looking  first  at  instrument by instrument  results  (Figure  9,  upper  side),  after 
controlling for all the regressors, the share of non significant differentials is over 60 per cent 
for four instruments and over or close to 50 per cent for six instruments.
32 In one case the 
homogeneity remains quite  low (bank overdraft to households). Results confirm that the 
more  sophisticated  instruments,  and  those  where  the  market  power  of  bank  customers 
counts, are characterized by more homogeneous prices. 
Turning to country by country results (Figure 9, lower side), the percentage share of 
non significant differentials progressively grows for all countries. After controlling for the 
overall effect of the regressors, it is close to or exceeds 50 per cent in ten countries (all 
except Spain and Portugal). The improvement is considerable for larger countries as well. 
Regarding  the  cross country  bilateral  (pairwise)  differentials,  Table  7  confirms  that 
geographical proximity and cultural characteristics do not systematically affect the similarity 
between interest rates. The number of non significant differentials grows between Benelux 
countries but remains low between Spain and Portugal and between Germany and Austria.  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
In spite of the long European integration process and single monetary policy, the euro 
area banking markets are still segmented. The econometric analysis, comparing bank rate 
                                                    
31 For repos the similarities increase moving from the second step to the third one, but they are still higher 
in  the  first  step.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  this  instrument,  compared  with  other  deposit  products,  is  more 
sophisticated  and  less  widespread  in  euro  area  countries  (see  Table  2).  These  circumstances  might  have 
influenced the partially atypical results.  
32 The increasing results are confirmed for the two rates margins to which we extended the analysis. For the 
spread between the average rate on total loans to households and on total deposits, the number of similarities 
progressively grows from 1 out of 66 in the first step, to 13 in the second step until to 30 in the third step; for 
the spread between the average rate on total loans to firms and on total deposits, it grows from 2 out of 66, to 7 
until to 17.  
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differentials in the twenty Italian regions with those of the twelve euro area countries, show 
that the degree of integration in a national banking market is higher than in the euro area. 
However, if we take into account some “demand side” regressors and “supply side” 
regressors  many  differences  disappear.  The  euro  area  prices  appear  different,  because 
national bank products appear different or because they are differentiated by national factors. 
There is scope for some further interest rate convergence within the euro area. If banking 
services become more similar, the prices will become more similar as well. 
Econometric results suggest that where the bank customer  is  likely to be stronger, 
because of greater market power or better information (corporations versus households, large 
versus small firms, repos customers versus current account customers), interest rates tend to 
be  more  homogeneous  across  Europe.  By  contrast,  geographical  proximity  and  other 
elements  of  natural  and  structural  “closeness”  between  banking  systems  do  not 
systematically influence the similarity of their interest rates as much as could have been 
expected.  
Further investigations of euro area integration will need longer time series on interest 
rates and new harmonized information on other indicators (for example on taxation). In the 
meantime, euro area cross border activity is expected to increase. This might homogenize 
banking behaviour and result in more integrated retail banking markets.  
 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
 
1. Econometric specification 
In the regressions we adopted the following general specification:  
ri, t = α't Ti, t + β'i Di, t + γ'g Xi, t + δ'h Zi, t + εi, t 
where: 
ri, t   is the interest rate, specific to each regression, for country i in month t; 
t = 1, 2, …, 27 months (from January 2003 to March 2005); 
i = 1, 2, …, n countries; n is equal to 12 when the interest rate exists in each euro area 
country; 
α, β, γ, δ are vectors (nt x 1) of coefficients; 
Ti, t  is a matrix (nt x t) of time (monthly) dummies; 
Di, t   is a matrix (nt x i) of country dummies; 
Xi, t   is a matrix (nt x g) of demand side regressors; 
Zi, t  is a matrix (nt x h) of supply side regressors; 
g and h  indicate the number of regressors, different in each regression, respectively, 
in matrix Xi, t and in matrix Zi, t; 
εi, t   is an error term. 
We regressed 14 types of bank interest rates on time, on a matrix of country 
dummies  and  on  two  matrices  of  their  determinants.  In  the  14  equations,  the 
dependent  variables  are  the  levels  of  euro  area country  bank  interest  rates on  14 
instrument categories: 5 categories of deposit interest rates (total deposits, overnight, 
with agreed maturity, redeemable at notice and repos); 5 categories of lending interest 
rates to households (total loans to households, bank overdraft, for house purchase, 
consumer credit and for other purposes); and 4 categories of lending interest rates to 




  We have selected all lending and borrowing interest rates on new business 
(for the period from January 2003 to March 2005) except those on deposits of non 
financial  corporations  because  of  the  low  relevance  of  this  category  in  several 
countries.  We  have chosen to focus on  new  business  because, unlike outstanding 
amounts,  these  rates  do  not  suffer  from  the  national  pre euro  affects;  and  on 
aggregated interest rates, overlooking the breakdowns by original maturity or initial 
period of rate fixation, because, while differences may exist for individual maturity 
and fixation period, this is not necessarily the case for the overall average interest 
rate. 
  The number of observations is 324 (12*27) when the interest rate exists in 
each euro area country, smaller in two cases: for deposits redeemable at notice, data 
are missing for Austria and Greece (therefore the observations are 297); for repos, 
data are missing for Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal (162 observations). 
  The coefficients βi of country dummies have been used for statistical tests of 
the  significance  of  bilateral  differentials  for  each  pair  of  countries,  and  hence  to 
assess the pairwise similarity between countries. The tests verify the null hypothesis 
that each pair of coefficients, estimated in the regression equations is equal: 
H0: βi = βj;   i ≠ j. 
For example, for the interest rate on overnight household deposits we calculated 
66 bilateral combinations: n (n – 1) / 2. We tested the null hypothesis that coefficients 
were equal at the 5 per cent significance level and we accepted or rejected the null 
hypothesis on the basis of the F[1, 27n – (i + g + h)] statistic. When the data does not 
reject the equality of coefficients, we say that the bilateral interest rate differentials 
are not significant.  
 Type  Covariates  Description  In equation of  Mean  St. dev  min  Max 
Real GDP growth  Real GDP growth rate  All rates categories  0.194  0.681   1.84  3.04 
Disposable income  Total disposable income on number of households  Deposit lending rates to hous.  28.442  7.539  10.504  38.706 
Altern. form of saving  Government bonds as a ratio of GDP  Deposit rates   2.55  1.43  0.07  5.87 
Altern. financing source  Firms’ market capitalization on bank loans  Lending rates to non fin. corp.  1.348  1.194  0.243  5.382 






Xi, t  Firms average size  Firms’ value added on number of firms  Lending rates to non fin. corp  1.611  0.35  0.734  2.395 
Bank operating costs  Operating expenses / average balance sheet total  All rate categories  1.648  0.490  0.54  2.68 
Bank non interest income  Non interest income / average balance sheet total  All rate categories  1.204  0.578  0.54  3.74 
Bank liquidity   (Cash + holdings of Government bonds) / total assets  All rate categories  0.043  0.041  0.0  0.191 
Bank capitalization  Capital and reserves as a ratio of total assets   All rate categories  0.063  0.017  0.035  0.104 






Zi, t  Bank asset structure  Long term loans on total loans  Lending rates  1.854  0.495  0.965  2.746 
Banks’ intern. presence 
Market share of branches and subsidiaries of non domestic 
banks as percentage of the total assets 
All rate categories  23.730  24.767  4.74  94.56 
Bank market concentr.  Share of the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets  All rate categories  52.99  20.891  20.454  84.261 





Zi, t  Bank M&As 
Number of domestic bank mergers and acquisitions on 
total number of domestic banks 





  The matrices Xi,t and Zi,  t include the same covariates in the regressions of the 5 
categories of deposit interest rates; in the regressions of the 5 categories of lending interest 
rates to households; and in the 4 categories to non financial corporations. The matrix Xi,t 
covers  “demand  side”  regressors,  while  the  matrix  Zi,  t  contains  “supply  side“  factors 
influencing  interest  rate setting  behaviour.  All  the  regressors  are  change  rates  or  ratios 
between two variables. The number of regressors g in the matrix Xi,t is equal to 3 in the 
equations of deposit rates and in the equations of interest rates on loans to households; while 
it is equal to 4 in the equations of interest rates on loans to non financial corporations. The 
number of regressors h in the matrix Zi,t is equal to 9 in the equations of all rates categories 
(see the Table). 
 
2. Data sources 
An element of the paper worthy of mention is the large use of European harmonized 
data collected by the ESCB. The data on bank interest rates have been recently harmonized. 
As long as possible, we have chosen harmonized figures also as covariates. Data sources, 
except for Italian regions, are these institutions collecting data at a European level. 
Bank interest rates. In our regressions, the dependent variables are different interest 
rate categories. As stressed in the paper, starting from the reference month January 2003, the 
Eurosystem has collected new harmonized data on bank interest rates. New data are called 
MIR,  the  acronym  for  MFI  interest  rates.  MFIs  (monetary  financial  institutions)  are  the 
intermediaries that have been required to submit reports to the ECB since the start of the 
third phase of Monetary Union. The category comprises central banks, credit institutions and 
all other resident financial institutions whose business consists in receiving deposits and/or 
close substitutes for deposits from persons other than MFIs and in granting credit and/or 
making investments in securities for their own account. Regarding interest rates, the MFI 
reporting population mainly consists of banks. These new statistics provide data on the euro 
denominated lending and deposit business of resident credit institutions vis à vis households 
and  non financial  corporations;  they  follow  harmonized  statistical  collection  and 




on new business and the remaining 14 on outstanding amounts. There are breakdowns by 
original maturity, notice periods or initial periods of interest rate fixation. In the regressions 
we used 14 aggregated instrument categories referring to interest rates on new business. The 
advantage of aggregation lies in the fact that differences may exist for individual maturity 
and fixation periods, but not necessarily for the overall average interest rate. 
Bank balance sheet  statistics. The amounts of deposits, short and  long term  loans, 
holdings of securities, capital and reserves, total assets and total liabilities are drawn from 
the dataset of the ECB containing ESCB harmonized balance sheet statistics. The data are 
harmonized, monthly, and refer to banks and other monetary financial institutions. ESCB 
harmonized  balance sheet statistics do not cover data on profits and  losses and on  non 
performing loans.  
Other bank balance sheet statistics. The figures on bank operating costs and on non 
interest income have been constructed from the database on Bank Profitability maintained by 
the  OECD.  The  data  on  risk  exposure  have  been  constructed  from  the  sample  figures 
published by Bankskope. 
Bank structural data. The figures on banking market concentration, number of banks, 
bank M&As, and the share of foreign banks are calculated on data published by the ECB.  
General  economic  data.  GDP,  number  of  firms,  firms’  value  added,  number  of 
households, and households’ disposable income are drawn from Eurostat. The figures on 
usual duration (number of months) of enforcement procedures for mortgage loans in euro 
area  countries  are  drawn  from  European  Mortgage  Federation,  “Efficiency  of  Mortgage 
Collateral in the European Union”, June 2002.  
Other  financial  data.  Market  capitalization  of  non financial  corporations  and 




Bank interest rates in Italian regions. In section 3.1, we have repeated for the Italian 
regions the same exercise carried out for the euro area countries in order to compare euro 
area segmentation with that of a member state (benchmark). The quarterly data on Italian 
regions’ bank interest rates are drawn from the Italian Central Credit Register (CR). The 
definitions are partially different in MIR statistics and CR data. To enhance the comparison 
we have selected the more similar aggregates (3 for lending and 3 for borrowing interest 
rates). 
Banking and economic data on Italian regions. The regressors used in the equations of 
Italian regions’ interest rates in section 3.1 are drawn from national sources: the regional 
data on  bad  loans  and  total  loans  and  the  Herfindahl  indexes  in  each  region  have  been 
calculated from Italian banks’ statistical returns; the data on Italian regions’ GDP are from 
the Italian national statistical office (Istat). 
3. Robustness checks 
The economic sense of the results is discussed in section 4 of the text. The aim of this 
section is to provide further information about the robustness checks of our estimates. 
A first way to check the robustness of our results was to introduce progressively the 
additional explanatory variables in order to control for the possible presence of endogeneity. 
In  the  first  specification,  we  used  in  each  equation  only  the  regressors  that  we  called 
“demand side” factors. In the second one, we introduced bank balance sheet characteristics. 
The  third  step  was  to  introduce  banking  system  structural  characteristics  as  well.  The 
explanatory power of the three regressions has remained noteworthy (Adj R² is around 0.99 
for all the instrument categories); and the results have not changed. Even the signs of the 
significant coefficients have always remained the same, although the significance level has 
changed.  
The  further  robustness  check  has  been  to  modify  the  last  whole  specification  by 
introducing interaction terms combining structural characteristics instead of using the single 




between  bank  average  size  and  market  concentration  and  between  M&As  and  market 
concentration) instead of the single three variables, has not changed the results and the effect 
of the remaining regressors.  
Another  way  to  check  the  robustness  of  the  results  has  been  to  substitute,  where 
possible, the single regressors with similar variables. According to the theory one of the 
main factors influencing lending rates is risk exposure. We used, as a proxy of riskness of 
loan  applicants,  the  figures  on  bank  loss  provisions  drawn  from  the  sample  database 
maintained by Banksope. The simple idea is that where banks have larger loss provisions, 
the borrowers are riskier. We stressed that a harmonized definition of bad loans does not 
exist in ESCB harmonized balance sheet statistics. However, we have been able to use as 
alternative variable the statistics on write offs/write downs of loans collected by the ECB. 
These series, while harmonized and relative to the entire population of MFIs, are less long 
and not available for all the countries. In any case, the use of these data has confirmed that, 
when significant, risk exposure affects lending rates positively. Our idea is that the share of 
loss provisions on total loans should act as a proxy also of the legal system’s capacity to 
safeguard lenders’ rights: again, where banks are forced to carry larger loss provisions it is 
because the legal system is less efficient. However, we used as a proxy of legal and judiciary 
system (in)efficiency the usual duration of enforcement procedures for mortgage loans as 
well. The results confirm that where time taken for the procedure is longer, lending rates 
tend  to  increase.  The  inclusion  of  this  regressor  did  not  distort  the  other  results  of  the 
estimates, but we eliminated it in the general specification because the availability of time 
invariant data limited our analysis on country coefficients. 
Other tests on alternative variables have not changed our results. We have used as 
indicator of banking market concentration the Herfindahl indexes in each country instead of 
the share of the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets. The results have remained the 
same, even if at a lower level of significance.  
In the indicator of alternative financing sources we have added the securities issued by 
non financial firms. The results have remained stable, but the data on securities issued are 




Finally, we have tried to change the denominator of some regressors represented by 
ratios:  we  have  substituted  the  number  of  households  with  GDP  in  the  indicator  of 
disposable income, and bank loans both with GDP and with the number of firms in the 
indicator of alternative financing sources. The results have always remained stable. 
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BANK INTEREST RATES IN THE EURO AREA 
(Average values: January 2003   March 2005) 
Euro area  minimum  maximum   
mean  St.dev.  %  country   %  country 
Italy 
Deposits – households  1.47  0.50  0.64  PT  2.30  NL  0.77 
  of which: overnight  0.74  0.35  0.14  FR  1.28  LU  0.64 
                  with agreed 
maturity 
2.05  0.23  1.58  IT  2.29  FR  1.58 
                   redeemable at 
notice 
2.04  0.83  0.27  ES  2.74  NL  0.97 
                   repos  2.11  0.20  1.85  FI  2.50  FR  2.01 
Loans – households   8.12  2.37  4.18  LU  13.24  GR  8.05 
 of which: bank overdrafts  9.91  2.52  5.72  LU  14.05  GR  8.65 
                  for house purchase  4.11  0.47  3.30  FI  4.78  DE  3.88 
                  consumer credit  7.24  1.65  5.00  FI  10.09  GR  9.11 
                  for other purposes  4.35  1.14  3,43  NL  7.25  PT  4.68 
               
Loans – non-financial corp.  4.90  0.95  3.55  LU  6.63  GR  5.51 
  of which: bank overdrafts  5.55  3.65  4.42  PT  17.50  ES  5.84 
                  up to €1 million  4.22  0.65  3.76  LU  5.92  PT  4.24 
                  over €1 million   3.22  0.39  2.97  BE  4.91  IE  3.14 
 Table 2 
EURO AREA 
COMPOSITION OF BANK BALANCE SHEETS (*) 
(percentage values; figures calculated on last quarter of 2004) 
ITEM  ITA  GER  FRA  SPA  NET  BEL  LUX  AUS  GRE  POR  IRL  FIN 
ASSETS 
Loans  69.7  74.1  61.9  73.6  79.2  61.9  60.0  73.8  69.9  77.3  50.5  73.2 
  of which: domestic customers  48.5  40.0  29.1  55.4  45.5  24.5  3.1  38.9  49.1  53.8  21.3  45.9 
Securities  13.6  17.9  19.5  14.4  10.5  24.0  35.5  15.5  18.6  8.7  41.4  11.5 
Shares and other equity  5.4  5.3  7.9  6.2  3.7  3.2  1.3  6.9  3.6  5.5  1.4  1.2 
Fixed assets  2.0  0.5  0.7  1.1  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.8  1.5  0.9  0.3  0.3 
Remaining assets  9.3  2.2  10.0  4.7  6.3  10.6  2.7  2.9  6.4  7.6  6.4  13.7 
LIABILITIES 
Deposits  57.3  66.2  60.5  73.5  69.4  76.7  65.5  64.9  78.8  76.7  55.6  55.0 
 of which: domestic customers                          
              overnight  22.6  9.9  7.3  12.0  9.3  7.8  4.7  10.3  35.7  13.5  6.2  20.7 
              with agreed maturity  1.7  13.3  7.3  16.3  7.9  6.0  4.7  20.8  14.8  21.2  6.5  7.7 
              redeemable at notice  2.8  9.0  7.8  8.6  12.6  16.2  0.7  0.0  1.3  0.0  1.0  4.2 
              repos  2.9  0.2  0.9  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.9  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Securities issued  18.6  24.2  13.8  9.8  17.6  6.6  8.7  24.6  0.3  8.3  12.9  17.2 
Money market fund shares  4.3  0.5  7.6  3.3  0.0  0.2  18.5  0.0  6.3  0.3  19.6  5.0 
Capital and reserves  6.9  4.3  6.5  8.0  4.0  4.1  4.8  6.0  7.9  8.6  5.0  8.2 
Remaining liabilities  12.9  4.7  11.6  5.3  8.9  12.4  2.5  4.5  6.8  6.0  6.9  14.6 





BANK INTEREST RATES IN THE EURO AREA 
CHANGES BETWEEN JANUARY 2003 AND MARCH 2005 
 
Euro area  minimum  maximum   
change  St.dev.  %  country   %  country 
Italy 
Deposits – households  -0.34  0.12   0.23  DE   0.69  LU  -0.37 
of which: overnight  -0.16  0.07  0.02  DE   0.56  LU  -0.33 
                with agreed maturity  -0.66  0.19   0.54  PT   0.78  FR  -0.57 
                redeemable at notice  -0.34  0.12  0.92  PT   0.97  LU  -0.05 
                repos  -0.71  0.23   0.33  AT   1.15  FR  -0.69 
Loans – households  
-1.03  0.33  0.01  IE   2.05  FR  -0.91 
 of which: bank overdrafts  -0.69  0.27  0.57  IE   1.50  FR  -0.60 
                 for house purchase  -1.07  0.27   0.50  GR   1.33  BE  -0.99 
                 consumer credit  -0.32  0.16   0.04  DE   1.34  FI  -0.93 
                 for other purposes  -1.06  0.28   0.40  PT   1.61  AT  -1.05 
Loans – non-financial corp. 
-0.85  0.24   0.17  GR   1.30  AT  -1.11 
 of which: bank overdrafts  -0.79  0.23  3.23  ES   1.37  AT  -1.05 
                 up to €1 million  -0.97  0.25   0.31  LU   1.20  AT  -0.91 






STATISTICAL TESTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BILATERAL 
DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN NATIONAL BANK INTEREST RATES 
(Outline by type of instrument) 
Number of statistically similar bilateral differentials 
First step  Second step  Third step 
 
Total 




for unit root 














 Deposits – households  66  1  2  15  34 
     of which: overnight  66  0  4  19  31 
                     with agreed maturity  66  7  3  27  35 
                      redeemable at notice  55  2  5  11  27 
                      repos  15  0  11  4  8 
           
 Loans – households   66  4  1  12  23 
     of which: bank overdrafts  66  3  1  12  22 
                     for house purchase  66  4  3  7  31 
                     consumer credit  66  6  4  13  32 
                     for other purposes  66  6  5  22  45 
             Loans – non-financial corporations  66  3  4  7  16 
     of which: bank overdrafts  66  2  8  26  42 
                     up to €1 million  66  5  7  14  33 






SIGNIFICANCE OF BILATERAL DIFFERENTIALS 
 BETWEEN NATIONAL BANK INTEREST RATES 
CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
Total number of bilateral differentials 
  AUS  BEL  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  IRL  ITA  LUX  NET  POR  SPA 
AUS                          
BEL  11                        
FIN  10  10                      
FRA  11  11  10                    
GER  10  10  10  10                  
GRE  10  10  9  10  9                
IRL  10  10  10  10  10  9              
ITA  11  11  10  11  10  10  10            
LUX  10  10  10  10  10  9  10  10          
NET  10  10  10  10  10  9  10  10  10        
POR  10  10  10  10  10  9  10  10  10  9      
SPA  11  11  10  11  10  10  10  11  10  9  10    
Total  114  114  109  114  109  104  109  114  109  109  109  114 
 
Number of non significant bilateral differentials: with time and country dummies (a)  
  AUS  BEL  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  IRL  ITA  LUX  NET  POR  SPA 
AUS                          
BEL  4                        
FIN  1  0                      
FRA  0  3  1                    
GER  2  2  0  0                  
GRE  2  2  0  0  0                
IRL  0  1  0  2  1  1              
ITA  2  1  1  0  0  1  0            
LUX  2  1  3  0  0  0  2  0          
NET  2  2  0  1  0  0  1  1  1        
POR  1  0  2  1  0  0  0  1  2  0      
SPA  1  3  1  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0    





THE DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
 IN EURO AREA BANK INTEREST RATES 
SUMMARY ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 





loans to non 
financial 
corporations 
GDP growth rate  n.s.  +  n.s. 
Disposable income  +  n.u.  n.a. 
Risk exposure  n.a.  n.u.  + 
Alternative financing sources  n.a.  n.a.  + 





Firms’ average size  n.a.  n.a.  – 
Bank operating costs   n.u.  n.u.  + 
Bank non interest income  +  –  n.s. 
Bank liquidity  n.u.  +  – 
Bank capitalization  +  –  – 






Bank asset structure  n.a.  –  – 
Banks' international presence  +  –  + 
Banking market concentration  n.s.  +  + 






Bank M&As  –  +  n.s. 
Legend:  n.s.: non significant coefficient. 
    n.u.: non uniform effect of variable, for each instrument category. 
    n.a.: non applicable variable. 
    +      significant and positive coefficient (significance at 5 % level). 
    –      significant and negative coefficient (significance at 5 % level). 
Note:  the Table shows the summary results of OLS regressions presented in the fourth section and in the 
Methodological Appendix. For the sake of brevity and synthesis, we did not report the analytical results; 
they are available from the authors upon request. The symbols ± indicate the signs of the coefficients 
when the effect of regressors on the dependent variable is significant at the 5 per cent level and uniform 
across interest rate categories, respectively for all kinds of deposit rates, and for all kinds of interest rates 




STATISTICAL TESTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BILATERAL 
DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN NATIONAL BANK INTEREST RATES 
CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
 
Number of non significant bilateral differentials: (Table 5   a) + demand side regressors  (b) 
  AUS  BEL  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  IRL  ITA  LUX  NET  POR  SPA 
AUS                          
BEL  3                        
FIN  6  4                      
FRA  3  2  3                    
GER  1  3  3  2                  
GRE  3  3  2  2  4                
IRL  2  5  1  3  6  3              
ITA  3  0  3  1  1  3  4            
LUX  2  2  7  3  2  1  3  2          
NET  5  4  3  3  2  3  2  2  4        
POR  1  3  2  3  2  1  1  3  3  0      
SPA  5  4  3  1  2  2  4  3  3  3  0    
Total  34  33  37  26  28  27  34  25  32  31  19  30 
 
Number of non significant bilateral differentials: (b) + supply side regressors  (c) 
  AUS  BEL  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  IRL  ITA  LUX  NET  POR  SPA 
AUS                          
BEL  6                        
FIN  7  6                      
FRA  4  6  7                    
GER  2  5  5  3                  
GRE  4  6  4  5  5                
IRL  7  6  8  6  7  4              
ITA  4  9  5  6  4  7  7            
LUX  9  8  6  8  8  5  4  8          
NET  6  7  4  6  4  4  6  7  8        
POR  2  3  4  3  7  5  6  4  5  1      
SPA  5  4  5  3  5  4  7  5  7  2  3    
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 Figure 4 
EURO AREA 
COMPARISON BETWEEN HARMONIZED AND NON-HARMONIZED INTEREST RATES 
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 Figure 6 
 
PERCENTAGE SHARES  
OF STATISTICALLY SIMILAR BILATERAL DIFFERENTIALS 


































































 Figure 7 
BANK INTEREST RATES 
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